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The Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise in
China: An Alternative to the Equity
Joint Venture
By BRYAN POWELL
Member of the Class of 1988
I. INTRODUCTION
The wholly foreign-owned enterprise' has been permitted in the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in restricted form since 1980, one year
after joint ventures were first legally sanctioned.2 It was not until 1986,
however, that the nation's planners began to promote the wholly foreign-
owned enterprise as another means by which foreign investors could
enter China's marketplace. By promulgating the Law of the People's Re-
public of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises (Foreign Enter-
prises Law) in April 1986, the Government, for the first time, provided
the legal framework to permit foreign investors to make substantial in-
vestments in all of China without a Chinese partner.3
1. For purposes of this Note, the "wholly foreign-owned enterprise" is defined as a busi-
ness entity established with 100% of the equity provided by the foreign investor. Unlike the
equity joint venture, the wholly foreign-owned enterprise by definition has no Chinese equity
partner. For a discussion of other business forms available to the foreign investor in China, see
infra note 11.
2. Yuan Zhenmin, China Adopts Law on Foreign Enterprises, BEIING REV., May 5,
1986, at 14. Joint ventures were first legally permitted in China with the enactment on July 1,
1979, of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, re-
printed in CHU BAOTAI, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: QUESTIONS & ANsVERs 115
(1986) [hereinafter Joint Venture Law]. For a translation of the Regulations for the Imple-
mentation of the Law of the PRC on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures, issued September 20,
1983 [hereinafter JV Implementing Regulations], see id. at 122. For a good discussion of joint
ventures and foreign investment in the PRC in general, see Moser, Foreign Investment in
China The Legal Framework, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAV IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 106 (M. Moser ed. 1984); Note, PRC-1983 Joint Venture
Implementing Regulations-The Supplement of Detail in an Attempt to Attract Foreign Invest-
ment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 389 (1985) (discussing the JV Implementing Regulations).
3. Law of The People's Republic of China on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises art. I
(adopted on Apr. 12, 1986), reprinted in Law on tWholly-Foreign Owned Enterprises, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., May 1986, at 26-27 (trans. by Paul, Weiss, Rifkin, Wharton & Garrison)
[hereinafter Foreign Enterprises Law].
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Passage of the Foreign Enterprises Law is seen by the Chinese and
some Western observers as a significant step forward in China's policy of
promoting foreign investment.4 In the past, Chinese leaders were reluc-
tant to permit investors to operate wholly owned enterprises for fear that
they would infringe on the country's sovereignty.5 Some conservative
officials still associate the wholly owned enterprise with the humiliations
brought about by the foreign domination of China in the pre-1949 era.6
The enactment of the Foreign Enterprises Law thus signals a victory for
the economic reformers in overcoming these fears. More importantly,
the Law represents the continuing importance China places on the role of
foreign investment in strengthening the domestic economy.7 Indeed, the
Government sees the Law as providing a major impetus in the growth of
foreign investment in China.'
In spite of the optimism by Chinese authorities, however, more cau-
tious Western observers feel that the Foreign Enterprises Law will not
spur foreign investment as much as the Chinese have indicated.' The
primary purpose of this Note is to examine these opposing viewpoints
and to discuss the effectiveness of the Law in expanding foreign economic
cooperation. I0
In order to understand fully the reasons for the enactment of the
4. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14; Macneil, Law On Wholly Foreign-Owned
Enterprises In China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., May 1986, at 9-10. See also Note, The New
Legal Framework for Joint Ventures in China: Guidelines for Investors, 16 L. & POL, INT'L
Bus. 1005, 1009-17 (1984) (contains a good discussion of policy determinations concerning
foreign investment in China).
5. Cheung, Another Leap Forward, CHINA TRADE REP., Aug. 1986, at 1. For an exam-
ple of the reluctance of the director of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade,
see Zheng Tuobin, Yu Fei Discuss Foreign Trade Laws, Conditions, Wen Wei Po, Apr. 12,
1986, at 12, reported in FOREIGN BROADCAST INFO. SERVICE, DAILY REP., CHINA [hereinaf-
ter FBIS DAILY REP.], Apr. 17, 1986, at 60.
6. Cheung, supra note 5, at 1. For a general discussion of the foreign presence in pre-
1949 China, see J. CHESNEAUX, M. BASTID & M. BERGERE, CHINA: FROM THE OPIUM
WARS TO THE 1911 REVOLUTION 172-91 (1976).
7. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, Liaowang Overseas
Edition, Apr. 7, 1986, reported in JOINT PUBLICATIONS REs. SERVICE-CHINA ECON. Av-
FAIRS, [hereinafter JPRS-CEA], May 9, 1986, at 67-70. See also Zhao Says Investment Here
Safe, China Daily, June 6, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
8. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67;
Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14.
9. See, e.g., Epstein, A Legal Opinion, CHINA TRADE REP., Aug. 1986, at 4; Goossen,
New Foreign Enterprise Law Gives Investors a Choice, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., June 15,
1986, at 9, 10; Torbert, Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Come of Age, CHINA BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1986, at 50-52; U.S. Investors, Part 1: Survey Shows Glitter of China Wearing Off, 11
Bus. CHINA 89 (1986); Cheung, supra note 5, at 1; Lubman & Randt, The Frustrations of
Investing in China, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, May 19, 1986, at 14, col. 7.
10. See Foreign Enterprises Law art. 1 (discussing the Law's goal).
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Foreign Enterprises Law, one must first understand the recent evolution
of foreign equity investment in China. Accordingly, this Note begins by
examining the background of foreign equity investment laws in the PRC,
focusing on the impact of these laws on the development of the two
forms of equity investment available to foreign investors: 1 equity joint
ventures and wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
This Note then discusses whether the Foreign Enterprises Law pro-
vides the necessary legal framework and sufficient guidelines to actively
encourage the foreign investor to establish a wholly owned enterprise in
China. Specifically, this Note examines whether the Law: (1) adequately
defines the nature and legal status of the wholly owned enterprise, (2)
sets forth the necessary guidelines for the establishment of the enterprise,
(3) explains the scope of operations of the enterprise, (4) defines the de-
gree of government interference and supervision, (5) outlines the proce-
dures for expropriating a foreign enterprise in the event that
expropriation should occur, (6) provides for adequate guidelines concern-
ing foreign exchange, (7) explains the applicable taxation procedures, and
(8) outlines the procedures for termination of the enterprise.
Finally, this Note compares the wholly foreign-owned enterprise
with the equity joint venture as alternative forms of equity investment in
China. This comparative analysis should aid the foreign investor in de-
ciding which business form to use when initiating or expanding business
operations in China.
II. EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN EQUITY INVESTMENT
A. Foreign Investment Legislation and Recent Developments
Foreign investment in the People's Republic of China has emerged
only recently. 2 The opportunity for foreign business concerns to partici-
11. Four different business forms of foreign investment are in use in China today: (1)
compensation trade, (2) "cooperative" business arrangements (l., contractual joint ventures
and offshore ventures), (3) equity joint ventures, and (4) wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Of
these forms of investment, only two permit foreign companies to operate direct equity invest-
ments in China: the equity joint venture and the wholly foreign-owned enterprise. This Note
focuses on these two forms of investment for three reasons: (1) the similarities between the
Joint Venture Law and the Foreign Enterprises Law, (2) the importance China places on these
two investment forms, and (3) these are the only two forms of equity investment available to
foreign businesses. See generally Moser, supra note 2, at 106, 115-36 (discussing the different
forms of foreign investment and equity joint ventures in particular).
12. I.d at 106. For most of the 1960s and 1970s, China followed a path of self-reliance
and discouraged most kinds of direct foreign investment. Id For an analysis of Chinas eco-
nomic policy during this period, see CHINA'S SOCIALIST MODERNIZATION 675-84 (Yu
Guangyuan ed. 1984).
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pate in China's economic growth through direct equity investments first
came to fruition with the enactment of the Law of the People's Republic
of China Concerning Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Invest-
ment (Joint Venture Law) in 1979.'" Statistically, the increase in foreign
investment since the passage of the Joint Venture Law has been phenom-
enal.14 By June 1986, foreign investors had established more than 6720
Chinese-foreign equity and contractual joint ventures, 130 wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises, and thirty-six offshore oil ventures. 1" Direct in-
vestment by foreign businesses reached 5.9 billion dollars for the same
period.
16
The rapid development of China's investment legislation during this
time was equally impressive. Before the advent of the official policy of
promoting foreign investment (popularly known as the "open door" pol-
icy), legislation governing and regulating foreign ventures was virtually
nonexistent. 17 As a result, foreign investors in the early years of the open
door policy were particularly concerned about the legal protection of
their investments."8 Hoping to dispel any misgivings that the foreign in-
vestors might have, the Chinese Government enacted legislation designed
to protect and encourage foreign investment. By the end of 1985, the
Government had passed more than one hundred laws and regulations
directed solely at the burgeoning foreign investment base. 19
13. R. DELFS, T. GORMAN & 0. NEE, CHINA 81 (1986).
14. This rapid growth has also been sporadic. In fact, much of the progress began only in
response to the passage of legislation and the institution of reforms specifically designed to
create a business climate that would be more attractive to foreign capital investment than in
the past. See infra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. See also Rui Mu, New Developments hi
China's Economic Legislation, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 61, 69 (1983); Moser, supra note
2, at 116; Guocang Huan, China's Open Door Policy, 1978-1984, J. INT'L AFFAIRS, Winter
1986, at 1, 10.
15. See A Myth Is Exploded, CHINA TRADE REP., Dec. 1986, at 4, 5. This rapid growth
in foreign investment is especially remarkable when one considers that the first Chinese-foreign
joint venture, the Beijing Air Catering Company, was not even established until May 1979.
See Chu & Dong, The 6 Years Since the Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures Came Into
Effect, RENMIN RIBAO, Aug. 25, 1985, reported in FBIS DAILY REP., Aug. 30, 1985, at Al.
16. See A Myth Is Exploded, supra note 15, at 5. All valucs throughout this Note are
indicated in United States dollars.
17. See generally Guocang Huan, supra note 14, at 1-12.
18. Id. See also Jing Wei, Legal Guarantee for Foreign Investors, BEuING REv., June 2,
1986, at 4.
19. Guocang Huan, supra note 14, at 10. For a discussion of some of the important laws,
see Jing Wei, supra note 18, at 4; CHU BAOTAI, supra note 2, at 6-7; Survey of Foreign Eco-
nomic Legislation Since Open Policy, Liaowang, Nov. 18, 1985, at 26-27, reported in JPRS-
CEA, Apr. 11, 1986, at 40. For a list of other important joint venture legislation, see Fenwick,
Equity Joint Ventures in the People's Republic of China: An Assessment of the First Five Years,
40 Bus. LAW. 839 (1985).
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The effect of published law on increasing foreign investment can be
significant. Tracing the growth in equity joint venture investment pro-
vides a clear example of the potential impact. From 1979 to 1983, China
completed fewer than two hundred equity joint venture contracts. In
1984 alone, more than 741 equity joint ventures were established.2"
Although other factors, including investor optimism, also played an im-
portant role, the promulgation of the Joint Venture Implementing Regu-
lations (JV Implementing Regulations)21 and the issuance of the Model
Contract for Joint Ventures (Model Contract)2" by the Ministry of For-
eign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) in early 1984 were the
most significant contributing factors to this enormous expansion in the
number of equity joint ventures.2 3 The published set of JV Implementing
Regulations removed the distrust created by the absence of official Chi-
nese policy on the establishment of joint ventures. Similarly, the Model
Contract put the JV Implementing Regulations into a usable form.
24
Both pieces of legislation worked together to convince foreign investors
that they could operate successfully in China.
Problems still remain, however, in those areas in which legislation is
either nonexistent or not publicly available. If laws are only internally
available," the Chinese negotiator knows what is permitted, but may or
may not reveal this knowledge to the foreign investor. For foreign nego-
tiators who know what they want, but are not sure what is permitted, the
negotiating process then becomes both time consuming and difficult.
2 6
Although publishing legislation can increase investment, more laws
do not necessarily guarantee more investment. The potential foreign in-
vestor's perception of the overall investment climate is probably determi-
native in the end. This situation is best exemplified by describing what
happens when foreign investors believe they cannot successfully operate
20. R. DELFS, T. GORMAN & 0. NEE, supra note 13, at 106.
21. See supra note 2.
22. The Model Contract provides the foreign negotiator with contract language that is
acceptable to the Chinese. By using the Model Contract, the investor need not waste endless
amounts of time on negotiating the wording of less important provisions. R. DELFS, T.
GORMAN & 0. NEE, supra note 13, at 106.
23. IM
24. Id
25. "Internally available" or neibu regulations are restricted documents, regulations, or
memoranda circulated among Chinese units and officials to guide them in their dealings with
foreigners. The content of neibu regulations are usually not revealed to foreigners. Negotia-
tions are thus further complicated as the foreign investor has no way of understanding the
neibu rules, which may regulate his or her commercial transaction. See Moser, supra note 2, at
2-3.
26. R. DELFS, T. GORMAN & 0. NEE, supra note 13, at 106.
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in China under prevailing conditions. 27
After a strong and steady increase in the number of foreign joint
ventures established between the years 1979 and 1985, the first six
months of 1986 witnessed a forty percent decline in the number of new
ventures, compared to the same period in 1985.28 The major reason for
this decrease was the prevailing pessimism of foreign investors who be-
lieved that the Chinese authorities were not adequately responding to
investors' complaints about the unfair pricing practices of local authori-
ties, obstacles to repatriating profits, changing policies, and innumerable
bureaucratic hurdles.29
The sudden downturn in foreign investment is also probably one of
the major reasons for the timing of the enactment of the Foreign Enter-
prises Law.30 Nonetheless, even when the Law was passed in April 1986,
the number of wholly foreign-owned enterprises established after its pas-
sage actually declined by twenty-five percent over the same period in
1985.31 This decline is more likely attributable to the negative invest-
ment climate and foreign investor frustration rather than inadequate leg-
islation governing wholly foreign-owned enterprises.32
Chinese officials are finally becoming sensitive to the problems that
have been discouraging new investment.33 In response to many of the
complaints, the Government has passed additional legislation, which
partially addresses the thorny issues of foreign exchange shortages, red
tape, and high operating costs. 34 The new regulations specifically aim to
27. See Schiffman, China's Policy Shift On Joint Ventures Heartens Investors, Asian Wall
St. J. Weekly, Dec. 29, 1986, at 15-16.
28. See A Myth Is Exploded, supra note 15, at 4.
29. See generally Bums, Why Investors Are Sour on China, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1986, at
F7, col. 1; Sterba, Firms Doing Business in China Are Stymied by Costs and Hassles, Wall St. J,,
July 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Lubman & Randt, supra note 9, at 14. But see Wang Beiming,
Managing in China: Patience, Patience, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Aug. 25, 1986, at 13 (blam-
ing the foreign investor for many of the problems).
30. Cheung, supra note 5, at 1. Although the Chinese started drafting the Foreign Enter-
prises Law in 1983, prior to the downturn in investment, the Law's passage came at a time
when investment was experiencing its first decline since the "open door" policy was promul-
gated. See A Myth Is Exploded, supra note 15, at 4; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-
Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67. China clearly hoped the Law would spur sagging
foreign investment. See infra text accompanying notes 63-64.
31. See A Myth Is Exploded, supra note 15, at 5.
32. See supra note 29.
33. See Zhao Says Investment Here Safe, supra note 7; do Rosario, A Time for Conces-
sions, CHINA TRADE REP., Oct. 1986, at 1, 4-5; Southerland, Party Leader Says China To
Extend Economic Reforms, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 1986, at Al, col. 1.; Liaowang Carries Inter-
view with Hu Yaobang, Liaowang Overseas Ed., Oct. 20, 1986, reported in FBIS DAILY Rvp,,
Oct. 21, 1986, at K4, K7.
34. The most important of these new laws addressing the problems of investors are the
[Vol. I11
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reduce exorbitant land use fees, provide easier access to utilities, allow
for the hiring and firing of laborers, and reduce taxes." How quickly
foreign investors will have a favorable response to these new laws and
regulations remains to be seen. In any event, it is against this back-
ground of the most recent developments in foreign investment that this
Note will examine the two available forms of foreign equity investment:
the equity joint venture and the wholly foreign-owned enterprise.
B. Equity Joint Ventures
The equity joint venture was the first business form available to the
foreign investor wanting to hold an equity position in a Chinese-foreign
enterprise.36 With the enactment of the Joint Venture Law in July 1979,
the Government created a means for the foreign investor to participate in
establishing a new legal entity in China and share in all of the manage-
ment authority, risks, and profits of the enterprise.37
The nation's planners initially decided that the equity joint venture
structure, with its pooled management and shared profits, was probably
the only channel through which foreign investors would be willing to
pass their proprietary knowledge and managerial skills on to China. In
addition to these benefits, the equity joint venture earns, through its ex-
ports, foreign exchange that is essential to fund China's modernization
program.38 Chinese officials also prefer the equity joint venture to the
wholly foreign-owned enterprise because it allows China to exert direct
influence on the foreign partner while gaining much needed technical
knowledge, management training, and foreign capital.39
Provisions of the State Council of the PRC for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment,
reprinted in CHINA TRADE REP., Nov. 1986, at 13 [hereinafter Investment Provisions]. See
Horsley, China's New Foreign Investment Provisions, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 1986,
at 7-10. For comments by Chinese authorities on how they plan to encourage foreign invest-
ment with the new legislation, see State 'Sprucing Up'Foreign Investment Environment, China
Daily (Bus. Weekly. Supp.), Sept. 17, 1986, reported in FBIS DAILY REP., Sept. 21, 1986, at
52; Premier Zhao Ziyang's Offer to Foreign Investors Reported, China Daily, Aug. 11, 1986, at
1, reported in FBIS DAILY REP., Aug. 15, 1986, at A2; Offlcial Ansvers Questions on Foreign
Investment, Xinhua, Oct. 9, 1986, reported in FBIS DAILY REP., Oct. 12, 1986, at K6; Gu Mu
on Provisions for Foreign Investment, Xinhua, Nov. 6, 1986, reported in EBIS Daily Rep., Nov.
7, 1986, at K8; Liaowang Reports on PRC's Investment Environment, Liaowang Overseas Ed.,
Oct. 13, 1986 at 3-4, reported in FBIS DAILY REP., Oct. 17, 1986, at K7-K9.
35. See Fung, Peking Announces Regulations Meant to Mollify Foreign Investors in China,
Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 18. See also sources cited supra note 34.
36. CHu BAOTAI, supra note 2, at 1.
37. Id. at 18.
38. See Fenwick, supra note 19, at 876.
39. One Chinese commentator explained why wholly foreign-owned enterprises are not
preferable to equity joint ventures:
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
The equity joint venture relationship between Chinese and foreign
partners has evolved considerably since the enactment of the Joint Ven-
ture Law.4" Shortly after its passage, a wave of optimism swept over
many foreign investors who envisaged the new Joint Venture Law as the
means of entering the world's largest untapped market.41 Chinese re-
formers shared and encouraged this optimism, although they perceived
the equity joint venture more as an important and effective engine of
rapid economic development.42
Despite high expectations on both sides, equity joint ventures were
at first somewhat disappointing. 43 The reasons for this slow start have
been explained as the result of conflicting expectations by the Chinese
Government and foreign investors.' For example, China saw the equity
joint venture as a foreign exchange earner whose products would be man-
ufactured for export. In contrast, the foreign investor was motivated by
the lure of China's domestic market and thus wanted to sell joint venture
output within the PRC.45
Moreover, the Chinese hoped to develop backward regions with
joint venture technology transfers, while the foreign investor preferred
the economically advanced locales with well-developed infrastructures
and skilled labor forces.46 China also wished to have joint ventures use
domestic raw materials and components. This notion clashed with the
foreign investors' desire for non-Chinese raw materials, which were gen-
erally superior, more dependable, and more accessible than the local
materials. 47 Finally, while the Chinese Government stressed its sover-
eignty and ultimate control over the joint ventures, the foreign investor
wanted sufficient autonomy to respond flexibly to changing market
demands.48
Foreign-owned enterprises are simply an important means by which China
opens up to the outside world and uses foreign capital. Because the capital of for-
eign-owned enterprises is wholly owned by foreigners, the Chinese side does not par-
ticipate in the operations and the management of the enterprises, We do not share
their profits. Nor is it easy for us to learn from their advanced technology.
Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 68,
40. See Fenwick, supra note 19, at 843-44.
41. See Moser, supra note 2, at 115.
42. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 839.
43. Moser, supra note 2, at 115.
44. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 876.
45. Id. at 842.
46. Id. Some of these backward regions, such as Inner Mongolia, even proved fortui-
tously advantageous to the foreign investor because of the peculiar characteristics of the prod.
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In addition to the conflicting expectations, other factors that con-
tributed to the discouraging pace of foreign equity investment include:
(1) a general downturn in the world economy in the early 1980s, (2) the
readjustment policies by the Chinese Government in 1980-1981,' 9 (3)
competition from neighboring Asian countries with more favorable in-
vestment terms, and (4) inadequate foreign investment legislation.5"
Given these conflicting self-interests and external pressures, it is not
difficult to understand why the development of equity joint ventures has
been unsteady. In an attempt to combat these problems, Chinese author-
ities first recognized the inherent contradictions and then took a more
accommodating posture toward foreign investors by issuing the JV Im-
plementing Regulations in 1983.1t These regulations, in addition to
other legislative reforms, dramatically improved the level of foreign eq-
uity investment.
To illustrate this turnaround, statistics show that in 1982, only eight
new joint venture agreements were signed, involving slightly over fifty
million dollars.52 By comparison, equity joint ventures for the years
1983, 1984, and 1985 numbered 105 (with investment totaling 515 mil-
lion dollars), 741 (1.1 billion dollars), and 1371 (1.8 billion dollars) re-
spectively. 53 The rapid growth during these years indicates a maturation
in the equity joint venture process, coupled with a Chinese Government
more experienced in working with this form of investment."
By 1986, the quick pace in equity investment began to subside as
more problems arose and foreign investors became disillusioned and frus-
trated.55 In order to address these new problems, Chinese authorities
drafted more laws and regulations, which were designed to encourage
investment in equity joint ventures. 56 The Chinese Government also re-
sponded by moving away from small- and medium-sized equity joint ven-
tures and focused instead on large-scale, complex ventures with roles
49. Major foreign contracts were canceled or suspended during this readjustment period
as China retrenched and attempted to regain control of its economy. R. DELr-s, T. GORSIAN
& 0. NEE, supra note 13, at 83.
50. Moser, supra note 2, at 116; D. BROWN, PARTNERSHIP WITH CHINA: SINO-FOREIGN
JOINT VENTURES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 92 (1986).
51. See Note, supra note 2, at 390-91.
52. D. BROWN, supra note 50, at 92.
53. Id.; China Economic Statistics, CHINA TRADE REP., Oct. 1986, at 16; A Time For
Concessions, supra note 33, at 1-2.
54. D. BROWN, supra note 50, at 92.
55. For an explanation of these problems, see text and accompanying notes 33-35.
56. See supra note 34.
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pivotal to overall national economic development.5 7 This shift reflected
Beijing's growing confidence in the viability of this form of foreign invest-
ment to fuel the domestic economy and the evolving equity joint venture
experience in general. 8
Finally, in a move to increase further the number of foreign ventures
and raise foreign exchange, the Government looked to the wholly for-
eign-owned enterprise as another way the foreign investor could establish
operations in China. The following section more closely analyzes the de-
velopment of this second form of equity investment currently available to
the foreign investor.
C. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
The Chinese Government held open the possibility of wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises in the PRC even at the time of the promulgation
of the Joint Venture Law. 9 The terms of the Joint Venture Law itself
reflected this, with its stipulation of a minimum twenty-five percent for-
eign investment, but no limitation on the maximum investment al-
lowed.60 Implicit in this stipulation was the idea that an investor could
seek approval for one hundred percent equity control if it so desired.
Nevertheless, Chinese leaders did not always agree on the ideologi-
cal and political acceptability of wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
61
This disagreement is not surprising given the pre-1949 history of domina-
tion by large, foreign trading companies and the concomitant exploita-
tion of China's resources. More importantly, some authorities opposed
the wholly foreign-owned enterprise because they believed it failed to
transfer advanced technology, Western management expertise, and prof-
its to China to the same degree as the equity joint venture.62
In light of such opposition, why would economic reformers actively
seek foreign investment through wholly foreign-owned enterprises? One
explanation for the liberalization that permitted wholly owned ventures
is that it reflected deep Chinese disappointment with the slow pace of
57. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853-54; do Rosario, Joitfor Joint Ventures, CHINA TRADa
REP., March 1986, at 1.
58. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853-54; do Rosario, Jolt for Joint Ventures, CHINA TRAD
REP., March 1986, at 1.
59. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853; Foreign Firms Are Seen Undaunted By Chinese Col-
trol of Joint Ventures, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, July 30, 1979, at 6. For a definition of the
wholly foreign-owned enterprise, see supra note 1.
60. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853.
61. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 69-70;
Cheung, supra note 5, at 6.
62. See supra note 39.
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equity joint venture investment.63 Another view is that the Govern-
ment's sanctioning of wholly foreign-owned enterprises is a welcome sign
of Chinese confidence that this business form, as it has evolved through
the equity joint venture, has successfully contributed to important na-
tional development goals."4 To be sure, supporters of the wholly foreign-
owned enterprise are quick to point out the ways in which it has bene-
fited the Chinese economy.65
Permission to establish wholly foreign-owned enterprises was first
implied in the official regulations enacted in August 1980 to govern the
Special Economic Zones (SEZs).66 The SEZ regulations encouraged for-
eign citizens and overseas Chinese to set up enterprises "with their own
investment."'67 Under these vague guidelines, many foreign investors be-
gan to establish the first wholly owned enterprises.
By 1983, wholly foreign-owned enterprises were well under way, es-
pecially in the Shenzhen SEZ.68 These projects, however, tended to be
small-scale overseas Chinese investments and only existed under the stat-
utory scheme unique to the SEZs.69 Moreover, these businesses generally
had short building cycles, quick returns, and high profits'°--not exactly
the type of foreign investment desired by the long-term planners.
The wholly foreign-owned enterprise nonetheless yielded some
needed foreign capital for domestic spending. By the end of 1985, just
63. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853.
64. Id ; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 70.
65. See Cheung, The Man Who Spoke Out, CHINA TRADE REP., Aug. 1986, at 1, 6. See
also infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
66. CHu BAOTAI, supra note 2, at 29-30. The Special Economic Zones were the forerun-
ners of China's open door policy and were designed to attract direct foreign investment into
China. The four SEZs established in 1979 were Shenzhen (the largest and most successful),
Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou. Some of the special rights granted to the SEZs included
greater autonomy in decision-making, favorable tax rates for investors, and open market pric-
ing. See generally Guocang Huan, supra note 14, at 6-7, 15-18. For a good analysis of the
development of the SEZ, see Moser, Law and Investment in the Guangdong Special Economic
Zones, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPuBLIC OF
CHINA 141-78 (M. Moser ed. 1984); Pattison, Special Economic Zones in the People's Republic
of China: The Provincial Experiment, 1 CHINA L. REP. 141-66 (1981). See also Investment
Climate in Special Economic Zones, Guangdong Shehui Kexue [Social Sciences in
Guangdong], June 2, 1986, at 58-62, reported in JPRS-CEA, Oct. 30, 1986, at 83-88 (discuss-
ing recent developments in the SEZs).
67. CHU BAOTAI, supra note 2, at 29-30.
68. Moser, supra note 66, at 145-47.
69. See Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises, BEUINO REV., May 5, 1986, at 16. These
enterprises are generally operated by investors from Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States,
Japan, Thailand, the Netherlands, and Macao. The largest number of investors comes from
Hong Kong and Singapore. Id.
70. Id. See Guocang Huan, supra note 14, at 1-12.
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four months prior to the enactment of the Foreign Enterprises Law,
more than 120 wholly foreign-owned enterprises had been established,
with a total investment of approximately 570 million dollars.71 This
number included many highly successful wholly foreign-owned enter-
prises set up by foreign investors in the hotel and service trades, in con-
trast to the more common enterprise generally found in the SEZs, which
produced and assembled goods for export. 72
Further significant shifts toward accommodating foreign investors
wanting to establish wholly owned enterprises included the expansion of
the "flexible" SEZ regulations to the fourteen important coastal cen-
ters.73 Because these cities included such economically developed areas
as Shanghai, Tianjin, and the experimental industrial region of Dalian,
this move was well-received by foreign investors.74
It was not until November 1984, however, that wholly owned enter-
prises were strongly encouraged by the well-publicized inauguration of
the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Corporation (3M) wholly
owned subsidiary in Shanghai.75 3M chose this investment vehicle over
the joint venture because of the important need for trade secret protec-
tion and maximum operational independence. In fhct, during negotia-
tions with the Shanghai Investment and Trust Corporation (SITCO), 76
the local press referred to the company's demands as "3M's three no's":
no Chinese equity participation, no technology transfer, and no
71. Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises, supra note 69, at 16.
72. For example, Hilton Hotels International is in the process of opening its Shanghai
Hilton, the first wholly foreign-owned hotel in China. This Hilton subsidiary will cost approx-
imately $85 million. See Pontzious, New Shanghai Hilton, Like Other Hotels in China, Faces
Great Wall of Problems, San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chron., Sept. 28, 1986, at D'S,
col. 1.
73. The 14 important coastal centers include Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai,
Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanji-
ang, and Beihai. Most of the business procedures and preferences found in the SEZs were
extended to these cities. See generally R. DELFS, T. GORMAN & 0. NEE, supra note 13, at
132, 136-37.
74. Id.
75. The 3M wholly owned enterprise was given much public attention not only because it
was the first such operation outside of the SEZs, but also because the Chinese wished to begin
promotion of this business form. The 3M subsidiary produces electrical insulation and resins
for distribution solely in China. See Heyden, The Silk Road to Countertrade, CHINA BUS.
REv., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 6-7; Ching, China Considering 100% Venture by 3M in Move Away
From Joint Ownership, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Mar. 7, 1983, at 3, col. 1; Richards, 3M SIgns
With China to Open Unit There That Will be 100% Owned by U.S. Krm, Wall St. J., Nov, 16,
1983, at 5, col. 1 (west coast ed.); Independent Foreign Business Set Up in Shanghai, reported in
FBIS DAILY REP., Nov. 15, 1984, at B4.
76. SITCO is a state-owned enterprise whose purpose is to introduce foreign capital, tech-
nology, and equipment into the Shanghai municipality.
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exports.
77
The Chinese authorities were willing to consider 3M's conditions
because of the high priority 3M placed on domestically producing its
products, which otherwise would have to be imported, and because of
3M's standard practice of training local personnel and passing on its
management and production expertise.7" Shanghai was the proposed site
of this first wholly foreign-owned venture outside of the SEZs, primarily
because the Government desired to promote regional autonomy in hopes
of attracting foreign investment more aggressively.79
With these experiences behind them, Chinese authorities expect that
by making wholly foreign-owned enterprises a more desirable investment
option, new foreign exchange will be raised. In essence, they want to
attract those businesses that otherwise would not consider investing in
China under the current Joint Venture Law.8" This promise of attracting
more foreign investment eventually led to the passage of the Foreign En-
terprises Law.
As briefly mentioned earlier, the enactment of the new Foreign En-
terprises Law was not without opposition. Indeed, the Law represents a
compromise between two different perspectives among members of the
National People's Congress (NPC) on the role of foreign capital in
China's drive towards modernization.8" Some NPC members believed
that the Law should be more strict than joint venture legislation in order
to compensate for the absence of a Chinese partner in the enterprise, the
lack of advanced technology transfer, and the loss of a share in the profits
of the enterprise.82 In contrast, other NPC members argued that wholly
foreign-owned enterprises offered a number of benefits to China's mod-
ernization policy by providing: (1) all of the necessary funds for the en-
terprise, (2) more advanced technology because of the foreigner's sole
control of the project, (3) transfer of technical skills to local workers, (4)
new jobs, (5) more tax revenue, and (6) a possible solution to the problem
of absorbing technology.83 One NPC member went so far as to argue
77. Heyden, supra note 75, at 6.
78. Id.
79. Fenwick, supra note 19, at 853; Heyden, supra note 75, at 6.
80. See Various Viewpoints on Draft Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law, Xinhua, Apr. 3,
1986, reported in JPRS-CEA, Apr. 22, 1986, at 54; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-
Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67, 70; Macao NPC Delegate, Xinhua, Apr. 3, 1986, re-
ported in JPRS-CEA, Apr. 22, 1986, at 55.
81. Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprise. supra note 7, at 67-70;
Goossen, supra note 9, at 9; Cheung, supra note 65, at 6.
82. Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 68.
83. Goossen, supra note 9, at 9. See Cheung, supra note 65, at 6.
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that the socialist nature of China's economy and its 400,000 industrial
enterprises would not be ideologically derailed by a handful of wholly
foreign-owned enterprises.
8 4
Despite the opposition, the new law was enacted in April 1986. The
question now being asked is whether the Foreign Enterprises Law pro-
vides the guidelines and legal protections necessary to encourage the es-
tablishment of more wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
The initial response by foreign observers to the Law was generally
negative, unlike the response to the Joint Venture Law, which was hailed
by most as a major breakthrough in Chinese policy toward foreign in-
vestment. According to these observers, the Foreign Enterprises Law
does not offer any startling concessions or encouragement to foreigners. 85
Rather than provide explicit guidelines for protecting the rights, detailing
the establishment, and clarifying the taxation and foreign exchange re-
quirements of the wholly-owned enterprise, the Law instead offers a loose
legal framework for starting operations.86
In spite of these criticisms, Chinese authorities have publicly stated
that the Foreign Enterprises Law is a major contribution to the existing
foreign investment legislation.87 Whether the Law will live up to the
high expectations of the Chinese can best be determined by examining
the Law itself.
III. THE WHOLLY FOREIGN-OWNED
ENTERPRISES LAW
A. Purpose
The Foreign Enterprises Law is similar to an enabling act. It pro-
vides a statutory authorization and basis for the establishment of wholly
foreign-owned enterprises (Foreign Enterprises) on Chinese land.88 The
twenty-four articles of the Law set out to accomplish four goals: (1) to
accelerate China's modernization by attracting those foreign investors
who would not otherwise invest in China under other business forms, (2)
to define the rights of the wholly foreign-owned enterprise, (3) to estab-
lish the rules according to which the wholly foreign-owned enterprise
may operate, and (4) to retain sovereign protection with China upon
84. Goossen, supra note 9, at 9.
85. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 4.
86. Id.
87. See Cheung, supra note 65, at 6; Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14; Jing Wei, supra
note 18, at 4.
88. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 1.
[Vol, I11
Foreign-Owned Enterprises in China
granting certain autonomy to the wholly foreign-owned enterprise.8 9
The Chinese perceive these four purposes as serving the long-term
national policy of opening up to the outside world.9° Authorities have
also emphasized that encouraging foreign investors to set up wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises in China is a long-term policy.91
B. Nature and Legal Status
Article 2 generally defines Foreign Enterprises as "enterprises that
are established within the territory of China in accordance with relevant
laws of China and whose entire capital is invested by Foreign Inves-
tors."92 This article specifically excludes branches of foreign companies
and other economic organizations. 93 Although the status of foreign rep-
resentative offices is not mentioned, the definition presumably excludes
them as well.
94
Article 8 states that Foreign Enterprises that meet the stipulations
of Chinese law concerning legal persons will obtain the status of a legal
person.9" This ambiguous article implies that some Foreign Enterprises
will be legal persons while others will not.9 6 The Civil Code section per-
taining to "enterprises with foreign capital" provides a clearer under-
standing of how foreign investors may qualify for legal person status and
seems to establish the true requirements to be a legal person as applied to
the foreign enterprise.97 This section sets forth four requirements to be a
"legal person" under Chinese law: (1) establishment in accordance with
Chinese laws, (2) possession of necessary property or finance, (3) posses-
sion of its own name, organizational structure, and site, and (4) "capabil-
ity of assuming civil liability."98 Under this last requirement, it is clear
that any Foreign Enterprise "unable to shoulder civil liability for its own
property or capital" cannot engage in business activities in China.99
89. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67.
90. Id. at 70.
91. Deng on Reform, Opening Up, Development, Wen Wei Po, Nov. 2, 1986, at 3, reported
in JPRS-CEA, Nov. 3, 1986, at K5.
92. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 2.
93. Id.
94. Macneil, Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises in China, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., May 1986, at 10.
95. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 8.
96. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14-15.
97. See Cohen, China Adopts Civil Law Principles, CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1986, at
48-49; Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14-15; Epstein, A Legal Milestone, CHINA TRADE
REP., Nov. 1986, at 15.
98. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14.
99. Id. at 15.
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The Law does not discuss the actual organizational structure per-
mitted the authorized Foreign Enterprise. As a result, several important
questions concerning organizational structure are left unanswered and
should be addressed in the implementing regulations. 1° These questions
include:' '1 (1) Is the Foreign Enterprise a limited liability company like
the equity joint venture?10 2 (2) What is the ownership structure of the
Foreign Enterprise? (3) May two or more foreign investors join together
to establish a Foreign Enterprise?"0 3 (4) What is the authorized manage-
ment structure of the Foreign Enterprise, or are there no limitations? (5)
How does the Foreign Enterprise interact with the Chinese bureaucracy
and other Chinese entities?
C. Procedures for Establishment
Articles 6 and 7 set out the procedures for establishing a Foreign
Enterprise, which are simpler than the procedures for establishing a joint
venture. 14 The first step is the submittal of an application to the "de-
partment under the State Council in charge of foreign economic relations
and trade or by other authorities entrusted with such powers by the State
Council."105 The other authorities appear to refer to the Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFERT) and its designees.106
Unfortunately, the approval process through the central government is
known to be both slow and laborious and may discourage investors.
0 7
In contrast, local authorities can approve the equity joint venture with-
out MOFERT approval, depending on the amount to be invested in the
venture. 108
The next step is the submittal of an application to the Administra-
tive Bureau of Industry and Commerce (ABIC) to obtain a business li-
100. The implementing regulations are discussed later in this Note. See infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
101. Macneil, supra note 94, at 10.
102. Unlike the Joint Venture Law, which specifically grants limited liability to the equity
joint venture (article 4), the Foreign Enterprises Law does not state whether limited liablity
applies. The new Civil Law does seem to imply, however, that the wholly foreign.owned en-
terprise has limited liability. See Cohen, supra note 97, at 48-49.
103. All changes or mergers of the wholly foreign-owned enterprise nevertheless require
approval of the administrative bureaus of industry and commerce. Foreign Enterprises Law
art. 10.
104. Foreign Enterprises Law arts. 6-7. See Cheung, supra note 65, at 6.
105. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 6.
106. Macneil, supra note 94, at 10-11.
107. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 3.
108. See R. DELFS, T. GORMAN & 0. NEE, supra note 13, at 136.
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cense.' °9 The final requirement is that the investment occur within the
period approved by ABIC. "0 This requirement presumably is to prevent
foreign investors from establishing "paper companies" and waiting indef-
initely before they begin to operate as true business entities."' Chinese
observers have stated that article 6 implies that foreign investors will be
required to prepare documents which describe themselves (including the
articles of incorporation of corporate investors) and provide the proper
credit information.1 2 Moreover, investors will need to provide a feasibil-
ity study on the enterprise to the appropriate authorities.'
13
D: Scope of Operations
The Foreign Enterprises Law does not explicitly define the areas in
which the enterprise will be authorized to operate. The Law simply re-
quires the foreign investor to supply advanced technology or export all or
a majority of its products, to observe China's laws and regulations, and
to establish enterprises that will benefit China. "4 These same restrictive
criteria are imposed on equity joint ventures." 5 MOFERT has stated
that the Law was intentionally left flexible on this issue in order to give
the Chinese and foreign investors some room in negotiations.' 1 6 More-
over, as China's requirements for certain lines of businesses change, the
Law will not need constant revision.
11 7
Chinese authorities predictably anticipate permitting Foreign Enter-
prises to be established in only a relatively narrow range of industries
that will serve China's development needs."1 Some observers believe
that the types of business in which a Foreign Enterprise can engage are
likely to include the manufacture of high technology equipment such as
computers, telecommunications equipment, and medical apparatuses." 9
On the other hand, it is expected that no Foreign Enterprise will be per-
109. Foreign Enterprises Law arts. 6-7.
110. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 9.
111. Paper companies or "hollow companies" are those companies that enter the China
market without substantial capital. See Macneil, supra note 94, at 11; do Rosario, supra note
57, at 1.
112. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 14.
113. Id. Feasibility studies are routinely used in joint venture applications. The require-
ments for these studies are mentioned in the JV Implementing Regulations ch. 2, art. 9, sec. 1.
For a detailed discussion on the feasibility study, see CHINA TRADE, June 15, 1986, at 6.
114. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 3.
115. See Joint Venture Law arts. 1-2, 5.
116. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 15.
117. Id.
118. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 68.
119. See, eg., Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
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mitted to engage in businesses that involve state secrets, to act solely as
an import and export trading company, or to deal in traditional Chinese
arts and crafts. 120
As has been the case with equity joint ventures, the State Council
still retains the power to restrict other industries in which Foreign Enter-
prises may be established, if it feels that a certain industry has enough
foreign investment.1 21 In other words, the permitted areas of business
will likely be readjusted and tailored to meet the needs of China's eco-
nomic development.
122
Article 15, which concerns operations, has provoked sharp criticism
from foreign observers. 12 This article states that in using any materials,
a Foreign Enterprise should consider using Chinese sources before for-
eign sources when both are available. 124 Problems arise for foreign inves-
tors when Chinese sources are available, but are either unreliable or
unable to meet delivery schedules. This unreliability forces investors to
import materials from outside sources in order to secure a steady supply
even when Chinese materials are less expensive to purchase.' 2  Strict
application of the Law in situations such as these could disrupt produc-
tion schedules of Foreign Enterprises.
Article 12 provides for the hiring of Chinese personnel by Foreign
Enterprises.126 The Law does not state, however, whether Foreign En-
terprises are required to use government labor agencies such as the For-
eign Enterprise Service Company (FESCO) to hire workers.127 In the
experiences of some previously established Foreign Enterprises, govern-
mental agencies have acted as a quasi-partner by providing the enterprise
with electricity and labor. 121 This consideration is important to the po-
tential investor since labor agencies not only often charge extremely high
rates, but also give only a small portion of the money to the workers,
thereby defeating any incentive program a Foreign Enterprise might
120. Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 5; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign.Ownd
Enterprises, supra note 7, at 69.
121. Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 5; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned
Enterprises, supra note 7, at 69.
122. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign.Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 69,
123. See, e.g., Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
124. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 15.
125. See Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
126. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 12.
127. FESCO is a government monopoly that assigns workers to Foreign Enterprises. Sev-
eral of the main complaints concerning FESCO include the long waiting lists to hire Chinese
workers, the varying levels of training of the workers, and the assigned wages that FESCO sets
for the workers that Foreign Enterprises employ. See Sterba, supra note 29, at 16.
128. See Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
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have to reward good workers.129 In any case, the implementing regula-
tions will presumably address this issue in more detail.'3
Even though article 13 expressly permits trade unions, Chinese au-
thorities have stated that as long as the Foreign Enterprises conduct their
activities within the approved scope of business, the trade unions will not
interfere in their legitimate activities.13
Because of the vagueness of these provisions concerning the scope of
operations of the foreign enterprise, many important issues not discussed
above are left unexplained. The implementing regulations will, therefore,
need to address questions such as the following:132 (1) Will Foreign En-
terprises be authorized to operate branches in more than one locality?
(2) Will they be authorized to operate in only one industry? (3) Will
Foreign Enterprises be authorized, like joint ventures, to import and ex-
port products they produce, or will they have to go through an author-
ized PRC import-export corporation?
E. Limits on State Interference
The Law has a number of provisions aimed at protecting Foreign
Enterprises. These provisions are meant to dispel any misgivings the for-
eign investor may have about using this business form in China. On the
other hand, the Law also has two provisions that reflect the Govern-
ment's desire to impose more stringent requirements on Foreign Enter-
prises than on equity joint ventures.
Articles 4, 5, and 19 of the Foreign Enterprises Law are three provi-
sions that protect the rights of Foreign Enterprises. Article 4 states that
investment, profits earned, and other lawful rights and interests of for-
eign investors will receive the protection of Chinese laws.' 3 3 Article 19
allows for the repatriation of "legitimate income" after taxes have been
paid.13 4 The Law does not define what is meant by "legitimate income."
Article 5 underlies China's conflicting desires to retain tight control
over Foreign Enterprises while attempting to provide the protection that
foreign investors demand. The article states simply that "the State will
not nationalize or carry out expropriation of Foreign Enterprises.' 35
This article, however, further provides that in "special circumstances"
129. The new Investment Provisions attempt to address this problem. See supra note 34.
130. See Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
131. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 1. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 15.
132. See Macneil, supra note 94, at 10.
133. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 4.
134. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 19.
135. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 5. See Macneil, supra note 94, at 10.
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the State may carry out expropriation, as long as it compensates the en-
terprise.136 This ambiguous provision offers foreign investors little assur-
ance that their enterprises will be free from expropriation. Unlike
previous foreign investment laws, however, this article provides that
compensation be given in the event of expropriation. Because the Law
does not mention how much or in what manner compensation is to be
given, the implementing regulations need to clarify all expropriation
procedures.1
37
In contrast to the articles giving protection to Foreign Enterprises,
articles 9 and 11 are two provisions that subject Foreign Enterprises to
close Chinese supervision. Article 9 states that the ABIC will inspect
and supervise the investment circumstances of each Foreign Enter-
prise.' 38 Article 11 provides that each Foreign Enterprise must report its
production and operating plans to the Chinese authorities. 139 Some for-
eign investors may feel that this is an unfair infringement on the secrecy
of their business plans and an encroachment on the overall management
of Foreign Enterprises. 4"
F. Foreign Exchange Controls
The Law does not address the problem of how to maintain a foreign
exchange balance-a problem that plagues all foreign investors.14 1 Arti-
cle 18 merely reiterates the general rule: "Wholly foreign-owned enter-
prises shall resolve the balance of foreign exchange receipts and
expenditures themselves.' 42 Unfortunately for the foreign investor, the
1986 Regulations on the Balancing of Foreign Exchange Receipts and
Expenditures for Joint Ventures, which attempt to address the foreign
exchange problems, do not specifically apply to Foreign Enterprises, 143
136. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 5. The Law does not define "special circumstances,"
although Beijing's C & C Law Office is reported to have said that an example would be the
state's right of eminent domain for the construction of public works. Epstein, supra note 107,
at 5.
137. Epstein, supra note 107, at 5.
138. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 9.
139. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 11.
140. See Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
141. China's foreign exchange controls prevent enterprises which operate in the country
from freely converting local currency (renminbi) into foreign currency, and thus, make rcpatri.
ation of profits extremely difficult. See generally Gelatt, The Foreign Exchange Quandary,
CHINA Bus. REv., May-June 1986, at 28-31.
142. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 18.
143. Torbert, supra note 9, at 51. For a good discussion of the Regulations on the Balanc-
ing of Foreign Exchange Receipts and Expenditures for Joint Ventures, see Ta-kuang Chang,
Foreign Exchange Balancing Provisions for Joint Ventures, E. AsIAN ExEcurivE REP., Feb.
1986, at 7.
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Nonetheless, these regulations may be helpful guidelines in resolving for-
eign exchange difficulties.
One method of resolving foreign exchange difficulties may be to seek
approval for domestic sales from the "competent authority," as provided
for in article 18."4 If the wholly foreign-owned enterprise, 3M China
Ltd., serves as a model, however, this will be a difficult alternative. 3M
China Ltd. received approval to use its local earnings to purchase Chi-
nese goods and export them, but the Chinese authorities later restricted
the total value and types of goods covered by the agreement. 145
G. Taxation
Article 17 states that wholly foreign-owned enterprises will pay
taxes in accordance with relevant state regulations.141 Since the special
tax legislation pertaining to wholly foreign-owned enterprises has not yet
been enacted, the enterprises will be taxed according to the existing For-
eign Enterprises Income Tax Law (FEITL).147 The FEITL tax rate var-
ies from thirty to fifty percent, depending on the amount of income
earned.1 4 8 One way in which a wholly foreign-owned enterprise may ob-
tain more favorable tax treatment is to invest in the SEZs, where the tax
rate on all enterprises is a flat fifteen percent.'
49
Preferential tax treatment is discussed in article 17, which provides
that "[w]holly foreign-owned enterprises that reinvest after-tax profits
within the territory of China may, in accordance with State regulations,
apply for a refund of part of the income tax already paid on the rein-
vested portion."15 A full refund most likely will be granted.' 5 ' In con-
trast, the Joint Venture Income Tax Law Regulations appear less
generous, since a joint venture partner that reinvests its share of profit in
the venture for a minimum of five successive years may receive only a
forty percent refund of the income tax already paid on the reinvested
amount.'52
144. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 18.
145. Torbert, supra note 9, at 51.
146. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 17.
147. See Yuan Zhenmin, supra note 2, at 15; Goossen, supra note 9, at 11.
148. The tax rate for equity joint ventures, by comparison, is 33%. This seems to indicate
that large-scale joint venture investments will benefit from a lower tax rate than wholly for-
eign-owned enterprises of the same magnitude. See generally Han, PRC Foreign Enterprise
Income Tax Law and Regulations, 6 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 712-13 (1983).
149. Id.
150. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 17.
151. Goossen, supra note 9, at 11.
152. Id. at 11, 12.
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Article 14 also requires Foreign Enterprises to conduct independent
accounting and submit accounting statements to tax authorities. 15 3 Fines
may be imposed for noncompliance, and in the most extreme case, the
ABIC may revoke the Foreign Enterprise's business license.' 5 4 At least
one Chinese authority believes that these stringent requirements are nec-
essary to prevent tax evasion.155 Finally, all Foreign Enterprises must
obtain insurance through Chinese insurance companies.'56
H. Procedures for Termination
Although no limit is set on the term of existence of Foreign Enter-
prises, article 20 requires foreign investors to report the term of each
Foreign Enterprise to the examination and approval authority. 57 The
same authority has the right to decide whether to extend the term.' In
the event that a Foreign Enterprise is to be terminated, a public an-
nouncement is required first, and then the business license will be can-
celled by the ABIC.159 The Chinese authorities clearly contemplate that
Foreign Enterprises, like equity joint ventures, will operate for a limited
amount of time.16°
I. Implementing Rules and Regulations
The Implementing Rules and Regulations, as provided for in article
23, have been drafted and are expected to clarify many of the uncertain
areas of the Foreign Enterprises Law that have been discussed above.'
6 1
Until these regulations are announced, however, some observers feel that
inve'stors will adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude rather than risk the un-
known by establishing a wholly foreign-owned enterprise. 62 This kind
of attitude would certainly have a negative impact on the growth of
wholly foreign-owned enterprises in the interim.
153. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 14.
154. Id.
155. See Various Viewpoints on Draft Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law, supra note 80, at 55,
156. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 16.
157. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 20.
158. Id.
159. Foreign Enterprises Law arts. 21, 22.
160. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 69-70,
161. Foreign Enterprises Law art. 23. See Zheng Tuobin, Yz Fei Discuss Foreign Trade
Laws, Conditions, supra note 5, at 60; Macneil, supra note 94, at 10. For a comparison with
the Joint Venture Implementing Act, see Randt, New Joint Venture Implementing Regula-
tions-A Step Forward, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 15, 1983, at 9-10.
162. See Cheung, supra note 5, at 1.
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IV. EQUITY JOINT VENTURE OR WHOLLY FOREIGN-
OWNED ENTERPRISE?
A. Choosing the Proper Business Form
Selecting the proper business form is not an easy task. Assuming
the foreign investor seeks to take an equity position in the enterprise to
be established, the investor must then choose between establishing an eq-
uity joint venture with a Chinese partner or operating independently by
establishing a wholly owned enterprise.
In determining which investment vehicle to choose under China's
current Joint Venture and Foreign Enterprises Laws, a company must
consider the importance of maximum operational independence, tax ben-
efits, and potential profits, as well as China's policy of "equality and
mutual benefit." '63 Perhaps more importantly, the investor must weigh
the advantages and disadvantages of operating with or without a Chinese
partner. The following examination of these considerations attempts to
provide insight into which business form is the most appropriate for the
investor under existing legislation and the prevailing investment
climate. 64
B. Equity Joint Ventures
1. Advantages
One of the major advantages of this business form is the existing
comprehensive legislation dedicated to equity joint ventures. Compared
to other forms of investment, the legislation governing equity joint ven-
tures provides a fairly systematic regulatory scheme.165 For example,
regulations governing the balancing of foreign exchange, which generally
are more favorable to equity joint ventures, are not fully addressed in the
Foreign Enterprises Law. 166 Moreover, application of tax privileges, re-
gistration procedures and identification of "authorized agencies" are
spelled out in the JV Implementing Regulations, but not in the Foreign
163. "Equality and mutual benefit" is a phrase first used by Chinese authorities at the
beginning of the "open door" policy. This phrase implies that foreign investors will be allowed
to enter China only if they recognize that their role in China, as seen by the Chinese, is to
contribute to China's industrial and economic development. It also precludes, however, ac-
cepting loss-making contracts by either party. See generally Goossen, supra note 9, at 12-13.
164. For a good discussion of investing in China using other business forms (mentioned
supra note 11), see Cohen, Some Problems of Investing in China, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING
BUSINESS IN CHINA: 1983, at 72-78 (Cohen ed. 1983).
165. Moser, supra note 2, at 116-17.
166. Goossen, supra note 9, at 12.
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Enterprises Law. 167
The participation of a Chinese partner may also be a key factor in
choosing the equity joint venture for several reasons. First, the Chinese
partner almost always provides an existing local base for operations .
68
This can translate to ready access to distribution and marketing chan-
nels- a key consideration when domestic production is anticipated. Sec-
ond, the local partner can also assist in obtaining production materials, a
factor that may be crucial when the enterprise requires domestic sources
of raw materials.16 9
Third, a Chinese equity interest in the project will probably ensure
the availability of local advice and consultation on such issues as opera-
tional and managerial matters with employees and local suppliers.
170
Although this advice may not be as critical for issues of operation, labor
negotiations may be handled better by the Chinese partner. Finally, the
local partner may have knowledge of and support within the local bu-
reaucracy, which could be used to secure a steady energy supply, assist in
hiring trained personnel, and reduce the red tape that could otherwise
overwhelm the inexperienced foreign investor.
171
From a tax advantage perspective, large-scale equity joint ventures
may also benefit from lower tax rate incentives and exemptions that are
not available to wholly foreign-owned enterprises.
72
2. Disadvantages
In some equity joint ventures, a Chinese partner might be the great-
est liability. Many foreign investors feel that the capital contributions of
the Chinese partner are overvalued. 173 The Chinese partner frequently
contributes land as its equity share and assigns the land an unrealistically
high value-usually equal to the foreign investor's cash contribution,
74
In addition, the constant need for consultation and unanimity with
the local partner is likely to result in a substantial loss of independence
167. Torbert, supra note 9, at 52.
168. See Goossen, supra note 9, at 12; Cohen, supra note 164, at 73.
169. See Goossen, supra note 9, at 12; Cohen, supra note 164, at 73.
170. See Goossen, supra note 9, at 12; Cohen, supra note 164, at 73.
171. See Goossen, supra note 9, at 12; Cohen, supra note 164, at 73.
172. For example, joint ventures can enjoy a 50% tax reduction for as long as they export
at least 70% of the total value of their annual production. For a description of other tax
benefits, see Bloomfield, Legal Aspects of Joint Ventures in China, INT'L Bus. LAW., Oct. 1986,
at 328.
173. Ho, Licensing in China: Practical Considerations and Tax Implications, 10 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 595, 600 (1987).
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by the foreign partner with respect to its normal operating methods."7 5
This loss of independence will be particularly acute when the two parties
have different objectives for the joint venture. 76 Even when both parties
have similar objectives, as embodied in the joint venture contract, differ-
ing views on how to reach stipulated aims often lead to an impasse.
These differences will be especially frustrating when the constant need
for time-consuming negotiations prevents a quick response to changing
circumstances such as new market developments.
77
Finally, the expectations of the Chinese and foreign partners are
often irreconcilable. The Chinese are generally more concerned about
developmental aspects of the joint venture such as technology transfer,
foreign earnings, and employment potential, in contrast to foreign inves-
tors who are more business oriented and profit driven.1
7 8
C. Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
1. Advantages
The main reasons for establishing a wholly foreign-owned enterprise
in the past have been maximum operating independence and the ability
to use a standard corporate philosophy that has been tried and proven in
other markets.1 79 Maximum operating independence allows the wholly
owned enterprise to react quickly and flexibly to changing conditions-a
critical factor in rapidly developing markets.' 80 Operating independence
also facilitates future development of the enterprise, since under this
business form, the foreign investor need not consult with Chinese part-
ners on decision-making and management issues.'' Finally, some for-
eign investors may find that the Chinese partner's greater involvement in
the bureaucracy actually hinders the approval process because of the lo-
cal partner's position within the rank-conscious bureaucracy.
8 2
Unrestricted access to all corporate resources and technology is an-
other virtue of the wholly foreign-owned enterprise, since there is no con-
cern over divulging too much information to a Chinese partner.,8 3
175. Goossen, supra note 9, at 12.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See A Myth is Exploded, supra note 15, at 4.
179. Goossen, supra note 9, at 12.
180. Id.
181. Id
182. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67;
Lieberthal & Oksenberg, Understanding China's Bureaucracy, CHINA Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1986, at 24-26.
183. This was a key factor in 3M's decision to use the wholly owned enterprise business
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Another advantage of this business form is that the enterprise keeps all of
its profits, unlike the equity joint venture, in which profits must be shared
with the Chinese equity partner.
84
Wholly foreign-owned enterprises also enjoy the same status as
state-owned enterprises when applying for equity loans and working cap-
ital from the People's Bank of China. 8 A final advantage of the wholly
foreign-owned enterprise is that the procedures for establishing the enter-
prise, in comparison with the equity joint venture, are less complicated
and usually involve shorter periods of negotiations. 86
2. Disadvantages
Previous criticisms concerning wholly foreign-owned enterprises
have centered on the absence of legislation governing these ventures.8 7
The enactment of the Foreign Enterprises Law, however, addresses these
criticisms only in part. Until the passage of the implementing regula-
tions, which should explain the Law's inherent ambiguities, the equity
joint venture will remain a less risky investment from a legal stand-
point. 1 88 The high degree of uncertainty about how the Law will be im-
plemented is compounded by a general lack of precedent. The safest
position would be to look to the implementation of existing local regula-
tions in the SEZs, where wholly foreign-owned enterprises have been op-
erating for several years.'89
Traditionally, the wholly foreign-owned enterprise has suffered from
a less favorable image in China than the equity joint venture.'90 Even
with the passage of the Foreign Enterprises Law, which indicates a grow-
ing acceptance of this business form, the wholly foreign-owned enterprise
still appears to be subject to more scrutiny by Chinese authorities than
the equity joint venture.' 9' Moreover, an important question remaining
is how the local authorities will accept this busine;s form.
form, since the protection of company trade secrets was a paramount concern, See supra notes
75-78 and accompanying text.
184. See Foreign Enterprises Law arts. 19, 24; cf Joint Venture Law art, 4.
185. See do Rosario, supra note 33, at 1.
186. See Bloomfield, supra note 172, at 328; Cheung, supra note 65, at 6.
187. See Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprises, supra note 7, at 67.
188. Examples of the possible variables discussed in the previous section of this Note in-
clude issues of liability, tax treatment, and scope of operation. See supra notes 88-161 and
accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province arts, 1, 10,
trans in CHINA Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 54.
190. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
191. Business plans, for example, must be disclosed in detail under articles 9 and 11. See
Foreign Enterprises Law arts. 9, 11; Zheng Tuobin, Yu Fei Discuss Foreign Trade Laws, Condl-
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Probably the most decisive factor against using the wholly owned
enterprise is the absence of a pre-existing local base for operations.'
92
Without the assistance of a Chinese partner who shares in the risks and
successes of the enterprise, there is less likelihood of local support or
influence in the local bureauacracy. This problem may be a significant
one for the foreign investor with no experience in dealing with the Chi-
nese bureaucracy.
Finally, local investment terms concerning tax and labor costs may
not be as beneficial as those available to a joint venture.19 3 This factor,
however, will be easier to address once the local regulations concerning
the wholly foreign-owned enterprises are published.
V. CONCLUSION
Developing countries commonly use joint ventures to attract foreign
investment and the associated benefits without relinquishing control over
the management and operation of an enterprise or losing the economic
sovereignty of the country. Not surprisingly, the Joint Venture Law,
promulgated in 1979, is the cornerstone of the new foreign investment
legislation in China. By passing this law, China has indicated its prefer-
ence for pursuing its modernization policy through cooperative business
ventures with foreigners.
The Joint Venture Law was enacted amid much fanfare and opti-
mism and unquestionably spurred foreign investment in China. Despite
the steady growth of these new ventures between 1979 and 1985, how-
ever, foreign investors began to complain about the barriers to repatria-
tion of profits, price gouging by Chinese organizations, and China's
cumbersome bureaucracy.' 94 These complaints, combined with conflict-
ing expectations inherent in the equity joint venture business form, com-
petitive pressures from abroad, and other factors, led to a significant
decrease in the growth of foreign investment during 1986.
Against this backdrop of declining foreign confidence in China as an
attractive place to invest, the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises
was enacted in April 1986. The Foreign Enterprises Law was seen as
evolving naturally from the equity joint venture legislation. The contri-
butions of the existing wholly foreign-owned enterprises operating in
China to the development of the domestic economy confirmed the need
tions, supra note 5, at 12; Liaowang Views PRC Laws on Foreign-Owned Enterprise. supra note
7, at 68.
192. Goossen, supra note 9, at 13.
193. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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to promote this business form. The Chinese Government believes that
the Law will provide the legal protection and necessary guidelines re-
quired by the foreign investor and thereby will stimulate sagging
investment.
A number of Western observers, on the other hand, are not as opti-
mistic. The Foreign Enterprises Law is vague and leaves many impor-
tant questions unanswered. Provisions relating to such essential areas as
liability, taxation, foreign exchange, and areas permitted for operation
are either extremely ambiguous or unsatisfactory as guidelines. As a
practical guide for the establishment of a wholly fbreign-owned enter-
prise, the Law falls short of its goal. China must enact more detailed
regulations addressing these and other key areas before the Law will
serve its primary purpose of encouraging wholly foreign-owned enter-
prise investment.
In the meantime, the potential investor will find it particularly diffi-
cult to decide whether to choose the wholly owned enterprise as an alter-
native to the equity joint venture or other business forms as the best
means of investment in China. For the investor deciding how to proceed,
the wholly owned enterprise will entail many more unknown variables
than the joint venture because of the present uncertainties in the Foreign
Enterprises Law and the lack of precedent for enforcing regulations con-
cerning this business form. The actual enforcement of the Law will thus
remain a key consideration for those foreign investors deciding whether
to establish a wholly foreign-owned enterprise.
Nonetheless, the wholly foreign-owned enterprise has several dis-
tinct advantages over the equity joint venture, including maximum oper-
ational independence, the ability to use standard corporate philosophy
and all corporate resources, and the retention of all profits earned. Of
course, the foreign investor will need to balance these factors against the
disadvantages of operating without a Chinese partner-a factor that in
the end might be determinative.
The enactment of the Foreign Enterprises Law and the more recent
foreign investment legislation is indicative of the importance the Chinese
Government continues to place on foreign investment and its role in
strengthening the domestic economy. Even during the recent leadership
change, Chinese leaders stressed that the open door policy of promoting
foreign trade and investment would continue. If this policy of opening
toward the West remains in force and the evolving body of foreign invest-
ment law continues to develop, more certainty in the investment climate
must result. In the long run, both China and foreign investors will bene-
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fit as the road toward expanding foreign economic cooperation becomes
more traveled and expectations are more readily satisfied.

